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Motives of corporate political donations:  
Industry regulation, subjective judgement and the origins of pragmatic and 
ideological corporations.  
 
Abstract 
What motivates corporate political action? Are corporations motivated by their 
own narrow economic self-interest; are they committed to pursuing larger class interests; 
or are corporations instruments for status groups to pursue their own agendas? 
Sociologists have been divided over this question for much of the last century. This paper 
introduces a novel case - that of Australia - and an extensive dataset of over 1,500 
corporations and 7,500 directors. The paper attempts to understand the motives of 
corporate political action by examining patterns of corporate political donations. Using 
statistical modelling, supported by qualitative evidence, the paper argues that, in the 
Australian case, corporate political action is largely motivated by the narrow economic 
self-interest of individual corporations. Firms’ interests are, consistent with regulatory 
environment theory, defined by the nature of government regulation in their industry: 
those in highly regulated industries (such as banking) and those dependent on government 
support (such as defense) tend to adopt a strategy of hedging their political support, and 
make bipartisan donations (to both major parties). In contrast, firms facing hostile 
regulation (such as timber or mining), and those without strong dependence on state 
support (such as small companies) tend to adopt a strategy of conservative partisanship, 
and make conservative-only donations. This paper argues that regulatory environment 
theory needs to be modified to incorporate greater emphasis on the subjective political 
judgements of corporations facing hostile regulation: a corporation’s adoption of 
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conservative partisanship or hedging is not just a product of the objective regulation they 
face, but also whether corporate leaders judge such regulation as politically inevitable or 
something that can be resisted. Such a judgement is highly subjective, introducing a 
dynamic and unpredictable dimension to corporate political action.  
  
 3 
Introduction 
Why do corporations make political donations? And when corporations do donate, 
do they follow a particular pattern? Are there factions and political blocks within big 
business, and if so, what motivates the different political tendencies? These questions have 
animated generations of sociologists, political scientists, and political pundits. 
Explanations have tended to focus on a few main solutions, with subtle variations within 
these approaches. Generally we can think of three main explanations: narrow corporate 
self-interest theories, which argue that political action is largely motivated by the self-
interest of individual corporations, interest generally routed in industry or nationality; 
broader corporate class-interest theories, which argue that corporate political action is 
largely motivated by the class interests of corporations in general, whether this be in 
political stability or lower corporate tax rates; and status group interest theories, which 
argue that corporate political action is motivated by the self-interest of one or another 
status group – such as managers or the upper-class - who occupy the highest decision-
making positions in a corporation.  
There are compelling arguments for all three theoretical perspectives. Advocates of 
each perspective with point towards, respectively, oil companies opposing laws to address 
climate change (consistent with narrow corporate self-interest theories); business 
associations putting forward policies that sacrifice short-term profitability for longer term 
stability (consistent with corporate class interest theories); and companies who, when their 
directors have attended one particular private school, are more likely to donate to 
conservative parties (consistent with status group interest theory). 
While one can point to such arguments and examples, the task of political 
sociologists to attempt to identify which, if any, of these theoretical perspectives is more or 
less consistent with the evidence in any particular country or jurisdiction This paper 
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examines a unique and extensive dataset of corporate political behavior from a relatively 
understudied but relevant jurisdiction, Australia. The paper argues that, in the Australian 
case, the narrow corporate self-interest theories generally, and regulatory environment 
theory in particular, provide the closest match to the available evidence. I argue that 
narrow corporate self-interest largely divides corporations according to the type of 
government regulations which their industry faces. Corporations in Australia are divided 
into those who face relatively heavy and settled regulation – who tend to adopt a strategy 
of bipartisan hedging in their political donation (and presumably lobbying) – and 
corporations in industries facing either little regulation or hostile regulation that is resisted 
by business – who tend to adopt a strategy of conservative partisanship in their donation 
behavior. 
In contradiction to the other major theories, the analysis finds very little evidence, 
at least in the Australian case, for differences in donation strategies based on status groups 
– such as upper-class schooling or membership of businessmen’s clubs – and or corporate 
class interest – such as coordination amongst interlocked directors. 
I argue that while regulatory environment theory is compelling, it’s scope needs to 
be widened to take better account of subjectivity. In particular, when explaining the 
behavior of corporations that face hostile regulation, it is important to incorporate an 
understanding of the subjective political judgements that drive corporate political action. 
When corporations face hostile regulation, what matters is not just the regulatory 
environment, but also the assessment by those leading a corporation, about whether such 
regulations are ‘inevitable’ or whether they can be resisted. This judgement about 
inevitability or resistance is highly subjective and introduces a dynamic, unpredictable 
element to corporate political donation strategies which is not implied by a mechanical 
application of regulatory environment theory. 
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This paper contributes to the literature in four main ways: with a dataset of 
unprecedented breadth (1,500 corporations and 7,500 directors) and depth (government 
boards, think tanks and business associations, rich lists, schooling and club membership); 
with a testing of virtually all major theories of corporate political action; through the 
analysis of a unique, insightful, and understudied case, Australia; and through arguing for 
the importance of regulatory environment theory, with an widening of scope to 
incorporate subjective political judgement. 
Given the spatial constraints of an article, and the author’s belief in the need for 
greater understanding of a largely neglected, yet seemingly powerful, theoretical 
framework, this paper has chosen to focus on being a theoretical and empirical evaluation 
of regulatory environment theory. While this paper provides substantive consideration of 
alternative theoretical frameworks, this consideration is less extensive that that given to 
regulatory environment theory. As such, the paper is best read as a theoretical and 
empirical argument for regulatory environment theory, with the strongest conclusions, at 
this stage, being drawn about the Australian case study. More tentative conclusions should 
be drawn about other theoretical approaches and other national contexts. 
Theories of Corporate Class Interest 
Theories which conceptualise corporate political action as driven by class interest 
are some of the most studied in the sociological literature. The two most important of 
these theories are class cohesion theory and inner circle theory. 
Class cohesion theory. Class cohesion theory argues that social connections 
between corporations, particularly interlocking directorates, are mechanisms by which the 
corporate community develops cohesive political action. A prediction of class cohesion 
theory is that corporations sharing a director will show similar political behavior, and it 
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generally argued that this is a mechanism by which broad class consensus is achieved 
amongst the corporate community. The evidence for class cohesion theory is mixed. 
Mizruchi (1992) finds that corporate political donations are not cohesive through shared 
directorships, but are cohesive through shared directorships through bank boards, 
suggesting corporations in structurally equivalent positions display similar political 
behavior. Burris (2005: 271) finds much stronger effects, with effects of shared 
directorships, and also indirect effects at distances of up to four or five intermediaries. 
Inner circle theory. Inner circle theory argues that directors and corporations that 
are tied to the rest of the corporate community – via interlocks and membership of 
business policy groups – tend to adopt a ‘class-wide’ perspective (as against the parochial 
perspective of an individual corporation) (Useem 1978, 1984). This ‘class-wide’ 
perspective gives rise to two types of political behaviors: first, directors and corporations 
with a ‘class-wide’ perspective tend to be in the leadership – the forefront – of changes in 
business political opinion. They tend to be the first group to move when a policy shift 
takes place in the corporate community (Useem 1978: 228). Second, directors and 
corporations with a ‘class-wide’ perspective tend to be more liberal/moderate in their 
political outlook. This liberal perspective arises from a sensitivity to the long-term 
interests of the corporate community and the escaping from a narrow, short-term profit 
orientation (Useem 1984: 114). 
Recent studies show that the evidence for inner circle theory is mixed. Martin 
(1995) found that companies with a Washington, DC, government affairs office were 
significantly more likely to lobby in favor of national health reforms that included 
employer mandates, suggesting more socially networked firms were indeed more liberal. 
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More recent studies (Schuler 1996; Caldeira et. al 2000) however, found little 
relationship. 
Burris (2001) argues that his research shows that while the most interlocked 
corporations tend to be more politically moderate in their donations, the most interlocked 
directors are actually more politically conservative in their donations than the average 
director. He argues that highly interlocked corporations’ donation behavior is more a 
reflection of their location in highly regulated (such as banking and transport) or defense 
industries. In contrast, centrally-located directors’ donation behavior (as individuals, not 
corporations) reflects their increased class socialization due to their central social role in 
the business community.  
Bond (2004) finds that corporations whose boards contain a large number of 
executives from other corporations have a decreased propensity to donate to the 
Conservative Party. Bond also finds that those corporations whose executive directors sit 
on a large number of external boards tend to be more likely to donate to the Conservative 
Party. Interlock studies in Australia have tended to not directly measure the effect of 
interlocks on political behavior (Wheelwright 1957; Rolfe 1967; Murray 2001; Alexander 
1998; Carroll and Alexander 1999; Alexander 2003). 
Theories of Status-Group Interest 
Theories which conceptualize corporate political action as driven by status-group 
interest fall into two main categories: elite theories and managerialist theories. 
Elite theory. Elite theory argues that the politics of corporations reflect the extra-
corporate social connections of their directors, particularly directors’ personal wealth, their 
upper-class schooling, membership of exclusive businessmen’s clubs, and listing in social 
registers (Bond 2007; Bond 2004; Domhoff 1998; Mills 1999 [1956]). The mechanism of 
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action is thought to be a class socializing effect: personal wealth and membership of upper-
class institutions subjects directors to the influence of the norms and values of conservative 
upper-class communities. 
Recent studies, particularly in the United Kingdom, show substantial support for 
elite theory. Bond found that in one year, 50 percent of corporate donations to the 
Conservative Party in the UK came from a small subset of corporations that are defined 
by their directors’ schooling and club membership (Bond 2003; Bond 2007; Bond, 
Glouharova, and Harrigan 2010). In the United Kingdom, Bond et. al. (2010) also found 
that listing in social registers is strongly correlated with directors’ membership of the 
conservative Business for Sterling group. In the United States, Burris (2001: 373) found 
that listing in the Social Register has a strong pro-Republican partisan effect on donations 
by corporate directors.  
Similar effects have been found for director wealth: In the UK, Bond, et. al. (2010) 
found that extremely rich directors (listed in the Sunday Times Rich 1000) are more likely 
to affiliate to the conservative Business for Sterling. In the US, Burris’s (2000) found that 
the ‘old wealthy’ (those who inherited their fortunes) are associated with greater 
donations to the Republican Party, whereas the ‘new wealthy’ are associated with greater 
donations to the Democratic Party.  
Managerialist theory. Managerialist theory argues that dispersed stock ownership 
increases the power of managers, and these managers are less committed to profit 
maximization, and, thus, more open to moderate/liberal political policies (Galbraith 1967: 
314-24, Burris 1987: 734). This theory predicts that publically, listed corporations (with 
dispersed stock ownership) are likely to be more moderate/liberal than privately owned 
corporations (with a small number of controlling owners interested in profit 
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maximization). Empirical research in this area is mixed. In Australia, Ramsay, Stapledon, 
and Vernon (2001) found that publically listed corporations (those listed on the stock 
exchange) tended to be relatively more bipartisan in their donations (71% to the 
Coalition), while Proprietary Companies (private companies) tended to make larger 
proportions of their donations to the Coalition parties (83.4% of donations to the 
Coalition). In the US, Burris (1987: 738) found no evidence of the effect of manager 
control on corporate political partisanship. 
Theories of Narrow Corporate Self-Interest 
The academic literature has four main theories of corporate political action that 
can broadly be classified as theories of narrow corporate self-interest: Legitimacy tariff 
theory, core-periphery theory, theories of conservative heavy industry, and regulatory 
environment theory. 
Legitimacy tariff theory. Legitimacy tariff theory hypothesizes that corporations 
which are foreign-owned will be less likely to engage in publically observable political 
actions (such as political donations, but not lobbying), so as to avoid the appearance of 
impropriety associated with foreign involvement in domestic politics (Mitchell, Hansen, 
and Jepsen 1997; Hansen and Mitchell 2000; Hansen, Mitchell, and Drope 2004).  
Core-periphery theory. Core-periphery theory (also called corporate liberalism 
theory) predicts that large, oligopolistic, and/or capital intensive corporations will be 
progressive/liberal because they are interested in long-term stability and are profitable 
enough to make material concessions to other interest groups (Kolko 1964; Weinstein 
1981; Domhoff 1967; Burris 1987; Burris and Salt 1990).  
Theories of conservative heavy industry. Theories of conservative heavy 
industry make the exact opposite prediction to core-periphery theory: they argue that large 
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companies are generally conservative because they have higher fixed costs, little interest 
in the domestic market, and are the target of populism (Burris and Salt 1990: 342).  
Regulatory environment theory. Regulatory environment theory argues that 
variations in the regulatory environment of a corporation’s industry is the most powerful 
influence generating differences in corporations’ donation strategies. (Handler and 
Mulkern 1982: 29; Burris 2001; Burris and Salt 1990; Burris 1987; Edsall 1984: 107-40; 
Useem 1984: 160-71; Himmelstein and Clawson 1985).  
Regulatory environment theory argues that political corporations can largely be 
divided into two types: ideological corporations and pragmatic corporations. Ideological 
corporations adopt a strategy of ‘conservative partisanship’. The goal of these corporations 
is to alter the outcome of elections in favor of conservatives. They aim to move the 
political center of gravity to the right. This is the natural tendency of corporations, they 
argue, unless other forces drive them towards pragmatism. Pragmatic corporations adopt a 
strategy of ‘accommodation’ to the existing composition of the state. Their aim is to secure 
and maintain a high degree of access to elected officials. They tend to have important 
political and economic interests to maintain, and prioritize maintaining these over any 
longer term, or larger class, goals of conservative forces. 
The most elaborate version of regulatory environment theory articulates five 
regulatory environments which determine whether a corporation adopts either an 
ideological or pragmatic strategy (Handler and Mulkern 1982: 29-32). I overview and 
update these for the Australian context in Table 1.  
Environment 1 (industries with cooperative regulation) is found in industries with 
long-standing, industry-specific regulation by the state, such as finance, utilities, transport, 
and communication. Companies in this sector aim to maintain access to regulators through 
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a strategy of accommodation, such as bipartisan donations in Australia, or donations to 
incumbents in the US. Hansen and Mitchell (2000: 894) found that regulation correlated 
with increased Political Action Committee (PAC) contributions, while Burris (2001: 371) 
and Burris and Salt (1990) found that regulated corporations showed a marked reduction in 
propensity to donate to conservative (Republican) candidates. 
Environment 2 (industries dependent on contracting and industry protection) is 
found in industries with either large sales to the government (such as defense contractors), 
or with a heavy dependency on the government for protection (such as tariffs). These 
corporations aim to maintain (and possibly extend) sales and protection through a strategy 
of accommodation similar to corporations in environment 1.  Hansen and Mitchell (2000: 
894) find that both defense contracts and government contracts correlate with corporate 
PAC contributions in the US. Burris (2001: 371) and Burris and Salt (1990) find that, 
consistent with regulatory environment theory, defense corporations, they show a 
dramatically reduced propensity to donate to conservative (Republican) candidates. 
Environment 3 (industries hostile to economy-wide regulation) is found in 
industries which are in conflict with economy-wide regulatory agencies concerned with 
environmental protection, equal opportunity, occupational health and safety, and general 
labor conditions (Handler and Mulkern 1982: 29-32). Industries in this category are 
generally associated with environmental and labor violations: chemicals, petroleum 
refining, paper and wood production, metal manufacturing, electoral equipment, motor 
vehicles, mining, and textiles (Burris 1987). These corporations aim to stop these 
regulations through conservative partisanship. Hansen and Mitchell (2000: 894) found that 
highly polluting industries showed a marked increase in PAC contributions, but there have 
been no quantitative examinations of the impact of environment 3 on political partisanship. 
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Environment 4 (industries targeted for specific hostile regulation) found in 
industries which are in conflict with the government over specific hostile industry 
regulatory action. Industries in this category are nationally and historically specific. In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s in the US, the oil and petroleum industry was an archetypical 
example of this type of industry (Handler and Mulkern 1982: 29-32). In mid-2000s 
Australia, a more appropriate example maybe the tobacco industry, with the widespread 
regulation of advertising, packaging, and large government sponsored anti-smoking 
campaigns.  Like companies in environment 3, the motive of these corporations appears to 
be to stop hostile regulations through conservative partisanship.  
Environment 5 (industries with little contact with the state) is found in industries 
which face little or no state regulation, make few sales to the state, and require few state 
protections (in the form of tariffs or similar measures) (Handler and Mulkern 1982: 29-32). 
Examples of an environment 5 industries might be, first, a service sector industry such as 
retail, that is dominated by small firms producing for the local market; or, second, a 
manufacturing sector, such as light manufacturing, which is dominated by small firms 
producing largely for export markets that require little state intervention to maintain market 
access. Corporations in such industries have very few pressures on them to accommodate 
to the existing composition of the state and, thus, are expected to act according to their 
conservative ideological disposition, and display conservative partisanship. 
[TABLE 1 about here] 
The setting: corporate political donations in Australia 
Australia is an industrialized liberal democracy of just over 23 million people, 
with the 12th largest national economy in the world. The Australian political system has a 
number of characteristics that make it a particularly useful case study of business politics, 
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in particular: relatively strong political donation laws, a strong political party discipline 
(unlike the US), and significant corporate political donations to both major parties (unlike 
the United Kingdom (UK)). 
Australia’s political donation laws give us confidence that the reported donations 
are a relatively accurate measure of corporate political preferences. During the period of 
this study (2005/6), the laws regulating political donations in Australia were seen to be 
relatively robust. Laws require that all payments (not just campaign donations) to parties 
and their associated entities must be reported (McMenamin 2013: 71). Both donors and 
recipients are required to declare payments, though donors are except from this 
requirement should they consider that they received adequate consideration (i.e. the donor 
considered the payment as an exchange for goods or services, not a gift). Until 2006, the 
limit for disclosure of individual donations was $1,500. The system in Australian is, 
however, not perfect. It is claimed that the Australian Electoral Commission lacks the 
resources to contest party or donors classification of payments. It is also claimed that 
certain large party foundations existing to channel anonymous donations to the parties and 
that it is possible for corporations to circumvent disclosure laws through making multiple 
small donations to different state branches and from shelf-companies (McMenamin 2013: 
72-3).  
Australia’s strong party discipline gives us confidence that the political donations 
made reflect party political preferences, as against simply being donations to individual 
candidates, often based on the candidate’s incumbency (as in the US system). The two 
major parties (the Australian Labor Party and the Coalitioni) are characterized by party 
discipline in the form of strong parliamentary whips, internal preselection of candidates, 
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and party supervision of political donations (McKeown and Lundie 2002; McAllister 
1991: 207). 
Because there are major political donations by corporations to both Australian 
parties, these donations provide us with an insight into both conservative and more 
moderate corporate political action. Corporate donations provide between one-third and 
half of both major parties’ income, and 17,000 out of a total 25,000 donations between 
1998 and 2005 (McMenamin 2012: 74).ii In this respect, Australia is similar to the United 
States and is in contrast to the United Kingdom. McMenamin (2012: 84) argues that the 
reason the center-left party (Labor) in Australia is the recipient of corporate donations is 
largely a result of its shift towards the political center in the 1980s, and Labor’s specific 
fundraising appeals to business since this time. In contrast, in the United Kingdom, there 
are virtually no donations from business to the Labour Party. Only 5.3% of British Labour 
Party funding came from business in 2007 (£1.1 million of £20.9 million total donations) 
(Rowbottom 2008). In addition, in recent years (since 2004), in the UK there has even 
been a substantial shift away from corporate donations to the Conservative Party, and 
towards donations by individuals (Rowbottom 2012: 12). While the UK case study allows 
us – at least up to 2004 – to study the relationship between corporate politics and 
conservative political parties, the Australian case allows us to also study the relationship 
with center-left politics. 
Table 2 shows a simple two by three classification table which attempts to capture 
these unique aspects of the Australian case study, as compared to the United States and 
the United Kingdom.  
[TABLE 2 about here] 
Data and Methods 
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A list of the largest 2000 Australian enterprises and their approximately 7,500 
directors (holding 10,000 director positions) in February 2006 was obtained from 
IBISWorld (which compiles the yearly Business Review Weekly Top 1000 Enterprises) 
(IBISWorld 2006). The directors and corporations were then matched against a range of 
social, economic, and political datasets. iii 
The primary unit of analysis is a subset of the IBISWorld Top 2000 Companies: 
the 1,575 for-profit corporations that have headquarters in Australia. Excluded are 425 
enterprises: 284 government-owned enterprises, 86 non-profit corporations, 87 New 
Zealand-based corporations, and two Papua New Guinea-based corporations. Foreign-
owned corporations headquartered in Australia are included in the analysis. 
 
Table 3 contains an overview of the main variables. 
 
[TABLE 3 about here] 
 
 
Variables.  
Political donations. Political donation data was downloaded from the Australian 
Electoral Commission (AEC) website on 3rd March 2006 (AEC 2006). Donation data was 
collated on the Australian financial year, so the most recent available data was the 
2004/2005 financial year.  
Regulated industry. Location in a highly regulated industry was coded as a binary 
variable. Regulated industries are categorized using Burris’s classification (1987) and 
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matched against the two-digit Standard Industry Codes in the IBISWorld Dataset. The 
classification system used is listed in Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Anti-regulation industry. ‘Anti-regulation’ industries (Burris 1987) can be 
broadly characterized as industries in which (1) there is an attempt by the government, by 
other social groups, or by one or more political parties to regulate the industry and (2) the 
companies in the industry oppose this regulation. Burris classifies the following industries 
as anti-regulation: chemical, petroleum refining, paper and wood, metal manufacturing, 
electrical equipment, motor vehicle manufacture, mining and textiles (Burris 1987: 736). 
The classification system used is listed in Table 5. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Defenseiv contractor. This was measured as membership of the Australian 
Industry Group Defence Industry Council (Ai Group DIC). The Ai Group DIC included 9 
of the 10 companies involved in the Top 30 Projects of the Australian Defence Force 
(Defence Portfolio 2006), as well as 6 other defense corporations.  
Government-owned enterprises, boards and committees. I estimated a 
corporation’s involvement in government decision making by calculating the number of 
directorship of government-owned corporations held by the directors of that corporation. 
The government-owned corporations are the 284 listed in the IBISWorld largest 2000 
enterprises. This includes 32 federal government bodies (including postal, taxation and 
scientific boards, the Reserve Bank, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, and the 
Export Finance Corporation), 143 state government bodies (including workers’ 
compensation insurance, health, road, energy, rail and water authorities, and 
superannuation funds), and 75 local government bodies (almost all local councils). 136 for-
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profit corporations have one or more directors who serve on these government boards. 
Almost all of this overlap is at the federal and state level. 
Who’s Who. Who’s Who in Australia is used as a measure of social status (similar 
to social registers in the US), and as a source of information on the school attendance and 
club memberships of directors (Crown Content 2005a; 2005b). 59.1% of the Australian 
directors have an entry in Who’s Who. This sample compares favorably to previous 
studies: for example, 33.7% of Useem’s (1984) UK sample and 30.3% of Bond’s (2007) 
UK sample were found in directories.  
Clubs and schools. I reduce the measure of clubs and schools to two variables. 
For schools, I measure the number of directors of the corporation who were educated at 
one of 15 exclusive private schools.v This list was obtained by comparing the 3,000 
secondary schools in Australia on a range of socio-economic and status measures (Write 
Response 2006). The major method for choosing these schools was (1) quantitative 
analysis, such as comparisons of school fees, analysis of frequency of appearance in 
Who’s Who biographies of upper class individuals, and lists of reciprocal sporting 
arrangements between schools (such as rugby union competitions); and (2) qualitative 
writings, such as histories, biographies, and newspaper reports, which gave insights into 
the status hierarchies between the various private schools in Australia. These two methods 
converged on a very similar set of 15 exclusive private schools. On reason that this set of 
15 schools was chosen, instead of more conventional classification such as simply 
‘private school’ is that private schools in Australia educate upwards of 10% of the 
population, which while exclusive, does not capture the type upper class elite institution 
traditionally identified by power elite research: traditionally we are looking for the 
educational institutions of the top one or two percent of the population. The variable is 
‘number of exclusive school graduate directors/total number of directors’. 
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For clubs, a list of the most prestigious 11 businessmen’s clubs was identified via 
a similar method of comparing club members on a range of socio-economic and status 
measures.vi The main method for selection of the most prestigious 11 businessmen’s clubs 
was by analysis of (1) clustering in two social networks developed from quantitative data 
on the clubs, and (2) qualitative writings, such as histories and newspaper reports, which 
gave insights into the status hierarchy between the clubs. The network analysis of clubs 
was conducted on, firstly, the network of reciprocal membership arrangements (which 
clubs allowed other club members from out-of-state to use their facilities); and, secondly, 
the network of shared memberships held by those listed Who’s Who who held two or 
more club memberships (since people of high status tended to hold membership of the 
same clubs). Quantitative and qualitative analysis revealed a core of high status 
businessmen’s clubs. It is notable that many of these clubs had reciprocal membership 
arrangements with exclusive businessmen’s clubs in other parts of the world that have 
been identified as elite by previous writers. The variable is ‘number of businessmen’s club 
memberships of directors/total number of directors’. 
As both a general measure of status (similar to ‘social register’ measures in the 
US), and a control, the proportion of directors listed in Who’s Who of Australia and Who’s 
Who of Australian Business is included as a variable. 
Rich 200 list. A dummy variable is created to represent corporations with one or 
more directors listed in the Business Review Weekly Rich 200 (BRW 2005). 91 
corporations have a director who is listed in the Rich 200. 
Interlocks with donors. I use two variables to measure cohesive political action 
amongst donor corporations. Equation 1 provides a formula for calculating the proportion 
 1
directors ofnumber 
 donors  bipartisanon  positions board external
  donors bipartisan with Interlocks 
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of directors on the board of bipartisan donors. Equation 2 provides a formula for 
calculating the proportion of directors on the board of conservative donors.  
 
 
 
Number of directors. Board size is measured by a count of the total number of 
directors. 
Number of interlocks. This is the number of director positions held (by directors 
of a corporation) on the other 1574 corporations in the dataset. 
Conservative think tank. A dummy variable was created to represent 
corporations with one or more directors on the board of a conservative think tank. In total 
21 corporations had directors who served on the boards of one of three conservative think 
tanks: the Sydney Institute, the Institute of Public Affairs and the Centre for Independent 
Studies (Sydney Institute 2008; IPA 2008; CIS 2008). 
Business association leader. A dummy variable was created to represent 
corporations with one or more directors on (1) the Business Council of Australia’s board 
of directors or policy committees (BCA 2008) and/or (2) the national board of directors or 
the national council of the other three major national business associations (Ai Group 
2008; ABLtd 2006; ACCI 2008). 
Listed/Private/Partnership. Almost all companies are classified into one of three 
types: Public Listed Industrial, Proprietary Company (private) and Partnership. The 
remainder (such as public trusts) represented a very small subset of the cases and were left 
out of all three major categories. 
 2
directors ofnumber 
 donors veconservati on positions board external
  donors veconservati  withInterlocks 
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Foreign-owned. Companies are labeled as Australian or foreign-owned according 
to their IBISWorld database classification.  
Revenue. To control and test for the effect of the size of a firm on its political 
behavior, the natural log (ln) of the revenue of each firm (measured in $A billions) is 
included as a variable.  
Results 
Conceptualizing donation strategies 
Overall, 9% of the 1575 corporations made donations. While it may appear that 
only a small portion of corporations in our dataset donated – 9% of the largest 1575 – three 
points are important to bear in mind. Firstly, the size of the sample means that a large 
number of small corporations are included in the dataset. Secondly, the nature of 
Australian capitalism means that a high proportion (42% of the total) of foreign-owned 
corporations are included in the dataset. Both smaller corporations and foreign-owned 
corporations have a significantly lower propensity to donate. If we examine just the 100 
largest Australian-owned corporations, we find that 36% make a donation. This level of 
political activity is comparable with that found in similar countries. For example Bond 
(2004: 70) found that between 1992-3 and 1996-7 the proportion of the largest 250 UK 
corporations making a donation varied from a high of 28% in 1992-3, to a low of 9% in 
1996-7. 
Previous studies have almost universally assumed that donation strategies are best 
modeled using one or another version of a continuous choice model (Burris 1987: 738; 
Clawson and Neustadtl 1989; McMenamin 2008; Mizruchi 1992; Ramsay, Stapledon, and 
Vernon 2001; Snyder 1990). Different corporate donations are treated as part of a 
continuous spectrum of possible actions: a dollar amount of ‘total donation’, the size of 
 21 
donation to a particular party, or some type of index of ‘relative preference’ for one party 
or the other. In this section, I argue that, at least in the Australian case, corporations tend 
to pursue only one of two distinct strategies. 
Previous studies have generally assumed two types of continuous dimensions of 
political action: the first is the size of donation (or ‘mobilization’); the second is the ‘bias’ 
or ‘partisanship’ of donations. I will treat each of these assumptions in turn and show their 
limitations. 
(1) A discrete choice model of donation size: For corporations, political donations 
represent an almost negligible expense, particularly for the largest corporations (Milyo, 
Primo, and Groseclose 2000, Ansolabehere and de Figueiredo 2003). In 2005/6, of those 
Top 2000  corporations that made a donation (IBISWorld 2006), the average total 
donations to the Coalition was $A40,999 while the average donation to the Labour Party 
was $A37,269 (AEC 2006). The largest donor to both major parties was Macquarie Bank 
(a major investment bank), which donated $A245,719 to the Coalition and $A239,408 to 
the Labor Party. There is substantial evidence that these sums represent almost no 
significant financial cost to major corporations, and that these sums are tiny in comparison 
to their capacity to pay. For example, the mean donation of the average Top 2000 
corporation who made a donation (~$A40,000) was less than the average male salary and 
only 0.005% (or 1/20,000th) of the average corporations’ annual turnover.  
The cost of donations is also insignificant when compared to the other political 
expenses of corporations. Twice the average corporate donation – $A80,000 – would not 
be enough to hire one proficient full-time lobbyist or government relations manager. Even 
the $A500,000 spent by Macquarie Bank on political donations was only equal to the 
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yearly salary which Macquarie Bank paid to the former Labor Premier of New South 
Wales Bob Carr to work for them (Mitchell 2005). 
The cost of donations is also insignificant when compared to political activities 
financed on an international scale by the Australian corporations in this dataset. The 
massive bribes paid by Australia’s largest corporations as part of the United Nations Iraq 
Oil for Food program exemplify this. In 2006, it was revealed that Australia’s largest 
corporation, BHP Billiton made a $A5 million ‘gift’ to the Iraq regime in 1996, and 
considered making a $A135 million ‘loan’ with the hope of securing favorable treatment 
by the regime (Grattan and Schubert 2006). Email records and testimony of BHP 
executives showed that the $A5 million ‘gift’ to the Iraqi regime is a completely 
insignificant sum of money to the management of BHP, and that the major reason the 
$135 million ‘loan’ was not made was not out of consideration of the financial cost but 
rather because of fears that it would appear to the public or to courts as a bribe (Grattan 
and Schubert 2006). In relation to the $A5 million ‘gift’, one commentator pointed out 
that this ‘tiny’ gift was equal 0.05% of the $A10 billion annual profit of BHP Billiton in 
2006 (McCrann 2006). In comparison to the ‘tiny’ $A5 million gift, the average corporate 
donation of $A40,000 to each major party is infinitesimal. 
Given this evidence, do corporate donations matter at all? For political parties they 
definitely do: they provide a vital source of funding (approximately one-third of total 
funding), and without it political parties would struggle to remain competitive. For 
corporations, the picture is less clear. For corporations, political donations represent an 
insignificant financial cost. One possibility is that political donations present a substantial 
legitimacy cost – both to corporations and to politicians. The legitimacy cost may arise 
from the appearance of impropriety, undue influence, bribery, or corruption, and the 
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consequent threat that this appearance poses to other priorities of corporate and political 
elites. This legitimacy cost may lead corporations to desire to make smaller donations, 
and politicians to desire to receive smaller donations. Regardless, because we do see small 
donations, in a narrow range, I argue that are better modeled using a discrete decision-
making model, based on simple measures such as whether a corporation made a donation 
(or not).  
(2) A discrete choice model of partisanship: The second dimension of strategic 
choice is the ‘bias’ or ‘partisanship’ of donations. In previous studies this has almost 
universally been modeled as a continuous variable. Partisan bias is generally measured by 
examining the division of each corporation’s donations between the major parties (such as 
between Democrat and Republican) or between types of candidates (such as between 
incumbents and radical-conservatives) (Burris 1987: 738; Clawson and Neustadtl 1989; 
McMenamin 2008; Mizruchi 1992; Ramsay, Stapledon, and Vernon 2001; Snyder 1990).  
The problems with a continuous decision-making model of partisanship can be best 
illustrated by comparing figure 1 and figure 2. Notice how the assumptions made when 
modeling donations as a continuous variable (figure 1) miss a sharp bifurcation in the data 
which is shown in figure 2: figure 1 does not include the second peak of corporations who 
give 90-100% of their donations to the Coalition. The next paragraphs explain in greater 
detail both these figures themselves, and the problem of modeling political donations as a 
continuous variable. 
[FIGURE 1 about here] 
Figure 1 is reproduced from McMenamin (2008). Figure 1 has been simulated 
based on an OLS regression of the continuous variable McMenamin calls ‘bias’. In this 
model, the dependent variable is the percentage of total donations going to the Coalition, 
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while the independent variables include firm size, party in government, and party’s 
success in the current opinion polling. We can see in figure 1 that 95% of donations are 
made by corporations that share their donations fairly evenly between the two major 
parties, with a bias towards the Coalition. Figure 2 is a histogram of the actual donation 
patterns of the corporations in the dataset for the current paper: the corporations of the 
1,575 companies who made a donation in 2004/5. Figure 2 shows the same clumping in 
the center of the graph that is found in figure 1. This is created by the donations made by 
corporations giving to both major parties in approximately even amounts. However, 
figure 2 also shows a second peak amongst corporations that give almost exclusively to 
the Coalition (90-100% Coalition).  
 
[FIGURE 2 about here] 
 
Figure 2 shows that the donation behavior of corporations is largely bounded and 
discrete: over 75% of all donations are made by corporations in just two regions. If we 
include the tails of these two regions (30-40% Coalition and 80-90% Coalition), then over 
90% of donations are accounted for by these two strategies: (1) donating approximately 
equally to both parties, and (2) donating all or almost all donations to the Coalition-only. 
Just as important for this discrete model of corporate donations are (1) the trough 
between the two peaks and (2) the lack of exclusive donations to Labor-only. These 
nearly empty areas of the histogram show that certain donation strategies are clearly 
proscribed. Negligible numbers of corporations give to Labor-only. Even fewer 
corporations divide their donations 20/80 or 80/20 (either in favor of the Coalition or in 
favor of Labor).  
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The solution I propose is to supplement the continuous measures of political 
donation strategy with two separate binary variables: ‘bipartisan donor’ (including all 
corporations that give between 20% and 79.9% of their donations to the conservative 
parties), and ‘conservative donor’ (including all corporations which give between 80% 
and 100% of their donations to the conservative parties).  
Statistical modelling 
The results of statistical modelling are presented in Tables 6, 7, and 8. Table 6 
shows the bivariate Pearson correlations of the dependent and independent variables. 
Table 7 shows the full models, with all variables included, and Table 8 shows reduced 
models, where only the regulatory environment theory variables are included, plus two 
basic controls (ln(revenue) and foreign). In this analysis I will focus on the interpretation 
of Table 7 (the full models). 
The main two dependent variables – bipartisan donor and conservative donor – are 
modelled in a multinomial logistic regression model, with non-donating corporations 
providing a stable reference group against which the two donation strategies are 
compared. These are presented in models 1 and 2 in Table 7 and model 8 in Table 8. The 
coefficients presented are the change in odds of being a bipartisan or conservative-only 
donor, as against a non-donor, for a one-unit change in the independent variable. 
For the sake of completeness, robustness, and to make this study comparable with 
previous studies, I include nine other models where the dependent variables are 
continuous (models 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 in Table 4, and models 9, 10, 11, and 12 in Table 8). 
The dependent variable in models 4 and 10 is the percentage of total donations to the 
conservative parties. The dependent variable for models 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12 are the 
cubed root of the dollar donation amounts. Dollar donation amounts are cubed to make 
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the distribution of the dependent variables more normal, while at the same time 
maintaining the sign (positive or negative) of the dependent variable. This transformation 
is considerably more elegant than transformations such as ln(x+1) when x can take on a 
value of zero (Cox 2011: 152-153). Models 3, 4, 9, and 10 are linear regressions, while 5, 
6, 7, 11, and 12 are Tobit models. These Tobit models treat the dollar donations by non-
donors as left-censored observations (since no corporation can make less than zero dollars 
donations). 
The models show little support for theories of corporate class interest: variables 
associated with class cohesion theory and inner circle theory are not significant 
There is slightly more evidence for theories of status group interest: of the 
variables associated with elite theory (Rich 200) is significantly associated with 
conservative donations, generally publically listed corporations (which according to 
managerialist theory should be associated with an accommodation strategy) is associated 
with an increased propensity to make bipartisan donation and greater dollar donations to 
the Labor Party.  
Theories of narrow corporate self-interest are considerably more successful. 
Legitimacy tariff theory seems to be evident in models 1-5, where foreign-owned 
corporations are less likely to donate to conservatives. There is, however, no association 
between foreign ownership and bipartisan donors or donations to the Labor Party. 
Nether core-periphery theory nor theories of heavy industry seem to make correct 
predictions with regards to company size (revenue): rather than size leading to any sort of 
partisanship in either direction, larger company size is associated with a general increase 
in propensity to make political donations of either type. 
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The models show moderate to strong support for predictions of regulatory 
environment theory. Model 1 shows that likelihood of making a bipartisan donation is 
significantly increased if a company has a director on a government board, located in a 
regulated industry, or is a defense contractor. Model 1 also shows that conservative 
political donors are more likely to be located in antiregulation industries. Models 3, 4, 5, 
and 6 broadly support this finding, with the models where the dependent variable is 
largely measuring adoption of a conservative donation strategy (Models 3, 4, and 5) 
showing no significant correlation between donation behavior and holding a position on a 
government board, while all showing a significant correlation with location in 
antiregulation industries. In contrast, Labor donations are strongly correlated with location 
in a regulated industry.  
There are some subtle differences between the discrete models (1 and 2) and the 
continuous models (the rest). Models 3 and 5 show that increased conservative donations 
are associated with regulated industries (though in model 3 it is only significant at the 
p<.10 level) and defense contractors (only in model 5). This seems to be a product of, 
firstly, the fact that a significant number of conservative donations were made by 
bipartisan donors (so conservative donations can be a proxy or indicator of bipartisan 
donation strategy and its underlying drivers), and, secondly, many bipartisan donors still 
gave moderately more donations to the conservatives than Labor (so bipartisan can still 
show a considerable conservative bias in dollar value, particularly when they are donating 
larger amounts). 
An important finding in models 2 and 7 is that all of the measurable relationship 
between regulated industries and a bipartisan donation strategy (model 2) or dollars of 
Labor donations (model 7) is actually mediated by financial firms: once financial firms 
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are controlled for, the relationship between regulated industry and bipartisan donation 
strategy (or dollars of Labor donations) disappears from our models.  
 Overall, the size of the effects of regulatory environment theory on our models is 
substantial: if a corporation has a director on a government board its odds of making a 
bipartisan donation are two times higher (than corporations without a director on a 
government board) (p<.05). If a corporation is located in a regulated industry, its odds of 
making a bipartisan donation are 2.3 times higher (p<.05), and 2.7 times higher if is a 
financial institution (p<.10). If a corporation is a defense contractor its odds of being a 
bipartisan donor are 11.7 times higher (p<.001). If a corporation is located in an anti-
regulation industry its odds of being a conservative donor are 2.1 times higher (p<.05).  
Ancillary analysis 
While statistical modelling provides strong evidence for the operations of 
environments 1, 2, and 3 of regulatory environment theory, it is important to integrate 
some ancillary analysis, based on qualitative and quantitative data, to properly understand 
some of the subtler limitations of regulatory environment theory, and also the strengths 
and limitations of alternative theories. 
Subjective political judgement in industries facing hostile regulation: Both 
quantitative and qualitative data suggest that to understand the political actions of firms 
facing hostile regulation, it is important to incorporate an understanding of the importance 
of the subjective political judgement of leaders of corporations in these industries. While 
our modeling of environment 3 (industries hostile to economy-wide regulation) shows 
that firms in an anti-regulation industry have 2.1 times higher odds of being a 
conservative-only donor (models 1 and 2); and were associated with significant bias in 
donations towards the conservative parties (models 3, 4, and 5), there is also some 
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evidence of an association between anti-regulation industries and donating to the Labor 
Party, but this was only significant in two models and only at the p<.10 level (models 6 
and 7).  
This mild association with labor donations could be being driven by a peculiarity 
of anti-regulation industries. In particular, the distinction between an anti-regulation and a 
regulated industry is in some ways simply a matter of a corporation’s subjective 
assessment of their best strategic option. Companies which believe regulation can be 
stopped by aggressive conservative partisan political action may do so, while those who 
see regulation as inevitable might adopt a strategy of engagement with both major parties. 
A qualitative case study of this, provided by Kellow and Simms (2004), showed that in 
the mining industry in Australia there was a marked transformation of the industry’s 
tactics over the decade of the 1990s, moving from an initial position of active hostility to 
indigenous and environmental legislation to one of support for negotiation and the 
regulation of the industry. This subtler conceptualization suggests that when faced with 
hostile legislation, the political action of a corporation does not flow automatically from 
the structural position of a corporation but rather depends on the subjective judgment of 
corporations (and their directors) about effective strategy. For example, in supplementary 
analysis (available on request), when we break down anti-regulation industries to their 
constituent industries some industries are strongly conservative (forestry), others 
undertook a bipartisan donation strategy (oil and gas). 
A similar argument can be made based on a qualitative analysis of the tobacco 
industry in Australia – an industry which should be an example of environment 4 industry 
(facing industry specific hostile regulation). As mentioned earlier, corporations in the 
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tobacco industry face a large amount of hostile new legislation, from smoking bans in 
eating and drinking places, to plain packaging legislation, and advertising restrictions. 
Table 5 shows the top three Coalition-only donors in 2004/5, and appears to 
support the predictions of regulatory environment theory, and the classification of tobacco 
as an environment 4 industry: two of the three top Coalition-only donors are tobacco 
corporations. 
There is, however, something of a wrinkle in the story of tobacco donations and 
Australian politics, which suggests that companies in environment 4, like companies in 
environment 3, base their donation strategy on the basis of political judgement, not only 
their structural conditions. One of the reasons that tobacco companies are Coalition-only 
donors is that the Labor Party decided in January 2004 that it will not accept donations 
from the tobacco industry (Brown 2004). A review of the donation record from 1993 to 
2003 shows that 34.9% of all tobacco industry donations during this period went to the 
Labor Party: $593,000 was donated to the Labor Party during this period, and $1,106,000 
was donated to the Coalition parties (Winstanley and Freeman 2015). This suggests that 
prior to 2004, the tobacco industry in Australia was adopting a bipartisan, hedging 
donation strategy, and to the extent that it is now adopting a conservative-only donation 
strategy this is largely a result of Labor Party strategy to distance itself from ‘big 
tobacco’, rather than tobacco corporation’s choice of a conservative partisan strategy. 
Corporations’ facing hostile regulation do not donate simply based on their industry 
location, but also based on their subjective assessment of effective political strategy. If 
corporations facing hostile regulation feel that regulation is inevitable, they may adopt a 
bipartisan strategy to manage such regulation, as the tobacco industry seems to have 
attempted to do prior to 2004. 
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Environment 5 (industries with little contact with the state). There was no 
evidence in the statistical modeling for the operation of environment 5. In the models, 
environment 5 should show up as negative coefficients for the effect of government 
boards, regulated industry, and defense contractors on conservative donations: companies 
free from the constraints of government should be free to pursue their ideological – that is 
conservative – agenda. 
While this quantitative evidence against the operation of environment 5 is strong, 
there is at striking qualitative example which suggests that environment 5 may operate as 
theorized. Note in Table 5, the second largest Coalition-only donor is the Gerard 
Corporation. This company is owned by a South Australian businessman Robert Gerard, 
one of the largest and most important donors to the Liberal Party. He is accused of being 
‘rewarded’ for his loyalty with an appointment to one of the highest government boards – 
the Reserve Bank of Australia (Colebatch 2005; Yaxley 2005). Yet, what is it that drives 
his high level of conservative politicization? Is he from the mining or forestry industry 
(environment 3)? No. Is he from the tobacco industry (environment 4)? No. He is from 
the manufacturing industry. And his company has little contact with the government, has 
a turnover of just $65 million per year, and it is the 1502nd largest corporation in the 
dataset. In the context of the other theories put forward in this paper, Gerard 
Corporation’s donation behavior does not make sense. However, according to the 
explanation/theory of environment 5 it does: Robert Gerard is a businessperson who is 
free from the constraints of contact with the state – he is in a small, manufacturing 
company with little government regulation and few, if any, state contracts – and thus he is 
free to act out his ideological predilections, which, as a businessperson, are towards the 
Liberal Party of Australia. 
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Alternate theories: How can we explain, theoretically, the lack of evidence for 
the predictions of elite theory and theories of corporate class interest? Ancillary analysis 
suggests that this likely a product of both national differences, and omitted variable bias. 
Detailed experimentation with simple multivariate models of the Australian data shows 
that correlations between the variables measuring both elite and class cohesion theories 
disappear once the correlations are controlled for just two other variables: ln(revenue) and 
listed (on stock exchange). Large companies and publicly listed companies are more 
politically active, recruit upper class directors to their boards, have larger boards with 
more interlocks, an interlocking with bipartisan donors, but in the Australian dataset the 
correlations between political activity and elite and class cohesion variables appear 
spurious. Note that size (revenue) must be modeled as the log of revenue: raw revenue 
does not show a linear relationship with political activity, and, in the simplified models, 
when raw revenue is used instead, most of the elite and class cohesion variables remain 
significant. 
A review of selected literature on this topic (Burris 1987; Burris and Salt 1990; 
Burris 2001; Burris 2005; Bond 2004; Bond 2007; Bond, Glouharova, and Harrigan 2010; 
Martin 1995; Mizruchi 1990; Useem 1984) finds only one study of political behavior of 
corporations that controls for size (revenue, market value, etc) using the log of size, and 
no studies that explicitly include public listing as a control variable (though several only 
sample within listed companies). The one study that did control for log of size (Burris and 
Salt 1990: footnote 6) includes a footnote that says that they found a similar phenomenon 
as reported in this study: interlocks – the measure of inner circle theory- was statistically 
significant when only raw revenue was used as a control, but once log of revenue was 
included, the evidence for inner circle theory disappeared. 
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These findings suggest that larger and publicly listed corporations are being 
motivated and/or enabled to control their external environment – whether through 
political action, interlocks, or upper class directors – and suggests the centrality of 
theories of corporate self- interest. Clearly, however, one must be careful to not conclude 
too much from this one study of corporations in one jurisdiction. It may, as a first step, be 
helpful to review previous data, if still available, and these two controls (log of size and 
public listing) in modelling. 
Interestingly, it is not variables conventionally associated with regulatory 
environment theory – such as defense contracts or regulated/anti-regulation industries – 
which are themselves the likely causes of omitted variable bias in previous studies. 
Rather, it seems, instead, that regulatory environment theory’s strength is to continue to 
have explanatory power, once other powerful explanatory variables (log of size and public 
listing) are controlled for. 
While this paper’s statistical modelling suggests that elite attributes are perhaps 
less decisive in determining corporate political action than emphasized in previous 
literature, the Australia dataset still shows a strong predominance of upper-class 
individuals amongst the directors of large corporations. Table 9, shows that directors of 
top 100 corporations are nearly 30 times more likely to be members of exclusive clubs, 
and between three and six times more likely to come from an exclusive school, than a 
member of the Australian public from their own age cohort.  
[TABLE 9 about here] 
Similarly, while these findings seem to contradict those which found inner circle 
theory or cohesion theory to be present in the US and UK (Bond 2004; Burris 2005; 
Mizruchi 1992; Martin 1995; Useem 1984), there is still significant evidence of cohesion 
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in the Australian network: of the 1,575 corporations, 461 (29.3%) could reach each other 
through director interlocks in the giant component. For the top 100 firms, this number 
rose to 76 firms who could reach each other (through the giant component of the larger 
network). Clearly, the Australian directors’ network is not an atomized and isolated 
corporate network. 
Conclusion 
This paper is animated by the desire to understand the motivations for corporate 
political action. Existing sociological accounts have tended to emphasise three theories of 
corporate political action: theories of narrow corporate self-interest; theories of corporate 
class interest; and theories of status groups utilizing corporations for their own ends. To 
test these various accounts, this paper presents a novel dataset with both breadth and 
depth: a dataset of over 1,500 Australian corporations and 7,500 directors, with 
information on corporate political donations, co-directorship with government boards and 
think tanks, school attendance, and membership of businessmen’s clubs.  
Theoretically and empirically the paper itself focuses on evaluating – in light of 
alternative explanations – one theory of corporate political action that was found to be 
particularly salient in the Australian case study: regulatory environment theory. As such 
the paper represents a strong test for regulatory environment theory, but a more modest 
test against alternative theoretical approaches. 
The paper finds little empirical support for theories of corporate class interest and 
domination by upper class status groups. This is surprising in the case of status group 
theory because business leaders in Australia appear to be quite upper-class: they are 
affiliated at much higher rates than the general population with a handful of exclusive 
clubs and private schools. It is also surprising in the case corporate class interest theories 
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(such as inner circle and cohesion theories), as Australian business leaders form a close-
knit circle of elites: three-quarters of the largest 100 companies are connected via 
interlocking directorates and, through this, can indirectly reach nearly 500 of the top 1,500 
corporations through interlocking director ties alone. 
The lack of support for these alternate theories may be because previous studies 
omitted to measure and control for key variables, or it could be explained by national 
differences between the business communities studied. In the Australian data, log of 
company size (ln(revenue)) and public listing explain almost all the significant 
correlations between political activity and variables measuring status and class cohesion 
theories. It was noted that these controls were largely absent from previous sociological 
studies of political behavior, and in one study where they were included in the modeling 
of US data, the evidence for inner circle theory disappeared once a control was included 
for log of size (Burris and Salt 1990). 
It is also, however, entirely possible that much of the differences between this 
study and others can be explained by national differences. In particularly, with respect to 
status group theory, it is true that Australian business never managed to create schools 
with the status dominance of Eton or Harrow in the UK. Attempts were made to make 
Geelong Grammar such a school for the Australian upper-class, but it seems that 
geographic distance, and the concentration of population in state capitals, resulted in a 
schooling system for the Australian upper classes that was fragmented across the capitals 
of six founding states.  
While this study does not find evidence for the effect of status groups and 
corporate class interests on political donation behavior in Australia, it is important to note 
that the findings to point to the likely importance of status group theories for explaining 
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recruitment to, and social mobility within, the corporate elite in Australia. It also suggests 
that perhaps corporate cohesion – which is substantial in the Australian network – may 
still turn out to be significant in Australia for forms of political mobilization and action 
other than political donations. 
Instead of domination by corporate class or upper class interests, this paper finds 
that corporate political behavior in Australia is largely explained by theories which focus 
on the narrow self-interest of corporations themselves. In particular, the explanatory 
framework of regulatory environment theory seems particularly compelling. In line with 
this theory, corporations divide into two main groups: those who adopt a strategy of 
accommodation, manifest as a bipartisan donation strategy, and those who adopt a 
strategy of conservative partisanship, manifest as a conservative-only donation strategy. 
Firms which are located in industries with settled, extensive regulation, or which are 
dependent on the state for support or sales (environments 1 and 2) tend to show a strategy 
of accommodation and bipartisan donation, while those located in industries facing hostile 
regulation (environments 3 and 4) or which are largely unaffected by state regulation 
(environment 5) tend to adopt a strategy of conservative partisanship and conservative-
only donation.  
The findings around environments 3 and 4 – companies in industries facing hostile 
regulation – are, however, not perfectly canonical, and suggest that regulatory 
environment theory requires modification. The political strategy of companies in 
industries facing hostile regulation needs to be understood as heavily dependent on the 
subjective political judgements of the corporate leaders in these industries. This political 
judgement dependents on whether corporate leaders in these sectors believe that 
regulation in these industries is inevitable or potentially able to be resisted. When a firm’s 
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leadership believe regulation is inevitable, it seems they do switch strategies from 
conservative partisanship to accommodation, despite the objective regulation in their 
industry remaining the same. 
This paper has important sociological implications for theorists of corporate 
political action. The view of Australian corporate politics that this paper presents is a very 
firm-centered picture. This firm-centered politics may not be central to the politics of all 
other liberal democracies – the UK and US may show more effect of upper-class 
institutions, corporate cohesion, and the influence of the inner circle (Useem 1984; Martin 
1995; Bond 2004; Mizruchi 1992; Burris 2005; Burris 2001; Bond 2003; Bond 2007; 
Bond, Glouharova, and Harrigan 2010) – but the Australian case study does provide an 
example, possibly an archetype, of corporate political action driven by narrow firm-
centered economic interests. In Australia, directors’ and managers’ political decisions 
appear to be driven by the needs of their individual corporation. The larger class or group 
goals, whether they be of the upper class, the political right, or the broader corporate elite, 
are largely subordinated to the firm’s own individual corporate goals. 
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i The Coalition being a near-permanent alliance between the major centre-right party, the Liberal Party, and the traditionally rural National Party. 
ii The two other funding sources for the major parties are government funding and returns on the parties’ own investments. 
iii A ‘match’ occurred when two directors had two identical identifiers. For example, the same name and working for the same company. 
iv I have used US spelling ‘defense’ in the text of this article, and the Australian/British spelling ‘defence’ in the names of Australian 
organizations. 
v The schools classified as ‘exclusive private schools’ are: Anglican Church Grammar School (QLD), Brisbane Boys College (QLD), Brisbane 
Grammar School (QLD), Geelong Grammar School (VIC), Melbourne Grammar School (VIC), Scotch College (VIC), Wesley College (VIC), 
Xavier College (VIC) , Knox Grammar School (NSW), St Ignatius College, Senior School (NSW), Sydney Church of England Grammar School 
(NSW), Sydney Grammar School (NSW), The King's School (NSW), Aquinas College (WA), Scotch College (WA), Hale School (WA), and 
Collegiate School of St Peter (SA). 
vi Athenaeum (VIC), Australian (VIC), Melbourne (VIC), Australian (NSW), Union (NSW), Brisbane (QLD), Weld (WA), Adelaide (SA), 
Tasmanian (TAS), Launceston (TAS), and Elanora (NSW). 
